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ABSTRACT
Hannah Arendt distinguishes between two different practices of freedom whose origins
are rooted into two historical human experiences: political freedom/action and
philosophical freedom/free will. She argues that the two experiences were different as
concerns the origin, the location and the conditions of each. Freedom of the will, or
philosophical freedom, is relevant only in solitude while political freedom is relevant to
people living together in political communities. Arendt also claims that the freedom of
the will is the origin of the ideal of sovereignty which constitutes its meaning in
commanding and demanding obedience. Hence, the free will realizes its freedom at the
expense of oppressing one’s self and oppressing others. In addition to presenting the
Arendtian accounts on the two types of freedom, I shall argue that Arendt’s notion of new
beginnings is an attempt to transform the faculty of will from a faculty which realizes
itself in commanding, either itself or others, to a faculty that realizes itself in initiating
new beginnings with others in the public realm.
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I

INTRODUCTION

In The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt concludes that human beings experience two
types of freedom, namely, political freedom and philosophical freedom. Through a
genealogical and historical account of freedom and free will, she infers that both types
are completely distinct in their origin, nature, and appearance. The most essential feature
that renders them different is the multiplicity of political freedom versus singularity in
philosophical freedom. In other words, political freedom is a phenomenon of a multitude
acting together, while philosophical freedom is a phenomenon of individual free will.1
It is quite paradoxical that both types of freedom, the political and the
philosophical, originally came from outside the philosophical tradition. Political freedom,
according to Arendt, was first experienced as human reality in the Greek polis; however,
Greek philosophy was the reversal of the reality of the polis, not its representation.
Philosophical freedom was born in the religious and Stoic experiences of the first century
A.D. Later in the Middle Ages, the problem of freedom was discussed in theology, which
transferred the problem to the discipline of philosophy. Therefore, philosophy had to deal
with a double difficulty: that of theology and that stemming from the perplexing problem
itself. This is why the problem of freedom “has been the last of the time-honored great
metaphysical questions…to become a topic of philosophic inquiry at all,”2 in comparison
to eternity, time, being, and so forth.

1

We will see later how plurality is the human condition of action. Arendt, The Human Condition, 15. Also
Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 199.
2
Arendt, “What is Freedom?,” 145.
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In this thesis, I shall explain how Arendt came to the two conclusions regarding
her unique understanding of the concept of freedom. The first conclusion argues that
there are two human experiences of freedom that existed in different conditions. The
second conclusion states that these two types of freedom are distinct.3 Two main aspects
clarify this distinction. The first concerns their separate origin in human experience,
which brought each of them into existence. The second involves the conditions that
specify and qualify both experiences.
Arendt explains that while political freedom originates in the ancient Greek polis
and finds its manifestation in praxis, philosophical freedom has a twofold origin in the
religious experience of Christianity and (even earlier) in the philosophical experience of
stoicism. Both of these experiences led to the discovery of the inner man, where the will
dwells.4 Moreover, the conditions of political freedom, on the one hand, and the
conditions of philosophical freedom on the other hand are completely different. Political
freedom is only possible under the condition of plurality, where fellow men found a
body-politic regulated by norms and laws and create organized public spaces, where they
can act together. Philosophical freedom, by contrast, is only possible on the condition of
solitude. Hence, no organized public space is required in order to experience internal or
philosophical freedom, and no fellows are needed.5

3

I write “unique” understanding because Arendt was the first thinker to point out that there is such
difference. Only, Montesquieu, as Arendt also remarked, has also noticed the difference. This remark will
be explained later in the section of relation.
4
Arendt discusses the origin of political freedom in her book: The Human Condition in while she discusses
the origin of philosophical freedom in her book: The Life of the Mind/willing.
5
Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 199.
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Arendt’s inference that the two types of freedom are distinct stimulates us to ask
whether the two types relate to each other, or whether they are entirely unrelated. Arendt
does not address the question of their relation explicitly; however, she points out that the
two kinds of freedom are opposed. In other words, the existence of one necessarily
nullifies the existence of the other. To be more specific, Arendt says that we normally
experience philosophical freedom through our faculty of will, or what she calls “I-will.”
In contrast, when we experience political freedom, we experience our actual abilities or
what she calls “I-can.” Because the I-will constitutes itself in commands, philosophical
freedom ends up in domination, while political freedom constitutes itself in the I-can;
thus, it ends up in cooperation with others because no one is capable by himself. The
latter is a completely external phenomenon, which takes place between equal agents that
are acting together and are not commanding each other, i.e. the phenomenon is an
intersubjective one. Thus, political freedom has no internal existence. We will see later
how the I-will, which is a completely internal phenomenon, crosses its boundaries to
realize itself as a commanding faculty demanding complete obedience and submission
from others.6 This is what Arendt claims to be the origin of the problem of sovereignty.
The paradoxical result is that the mental faculty which we habitually consider to be the
faculty of the very experience of human freedom, ends in the utter dominance of one will
over the wills of others, who end up by being completely deprived of their freedom. From
this perspective, the will, paradoxically enough, is an organ for domination when it
extends itself to the public realm.

6

In the 4th section: relation.
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In this thesis, in addition to explaining and summarizing the Arendtian theory of
the two freedoms, I claim that Arendt seeks to transform the faculty of will from a faculty
that realizes itself in commanding and obeying, both internally and externally, to a
faculty that realizes itself in the act of beginning. Arendt does not state explicitly that she
is seeking a transformation of the faculty of will. However, I will argue that since she
sees no compromise between the domination-seeking faculty and freedom, she wants to
abolish the domination of the faculty of will and to direct the will towards the outer
world, where it experiences the freedom of action in inciting a beginning with others.
How does Arendt transform the faculty of will from an organ of domination into
an organ of freedom? I shall explore the subject by following the Arendtian argument
through three main phases. First, I will explain what she means by political and
philosophical freedom. Second, I will address the difference between the two types and
the relationship between them. Third, I will arrive at the crux of the thesis, which is
arguing why Arendt transformed the faculty of will into a faculty of beginning.

10

II

POLITICAL FREEDOM

Arendt argues that the Greeks, shaped by their life in the polis, experienced a reality of
freedom that has no connection to the Will.7 This claim is strange since we, in our
modern times, tend to think that freedom is an expression of the Will. For us, the Will is
the mainspring of action, which bears responsibility for experiencing ourselves as free
agents.8 Bearing in mind this modern understanding of relating action to the will,
Arendt’s analysis that Greeks experienced freedom in the polis, and at the same time, this
experience is not an expression of the faculty of Will would be problematic. If the Greeks
were unaware of the faculty of will, as Arendt maintains, then freedom for them is not a
phenomenon of I-will.9 Hence, the question guiding the argument is: what is freedom an
expression of? Moreover, if the Greeks did not discover the faculty of the Will, how can
the faculty of choice, which was already discussed by Aristotle, be understood as
different from the faculty of Will? 10
To address this issue, I shall explain how Arendt describes and depicts the
Greek’s polis, how Greeks interpreted human activity as Arendt analyzes and why they
did not discover the faculty of Will. In the following three subsections, I shall explain:
first, Vita Activa and the Human Condition; second, the Political, Action and Freedom;
and third, Time and the Faculty of Choice.

7

Arendt’s method in understanding freedom is to look into Greek experience as an exemplary and basic
human experience.
8
Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 57.
9
Arendt coins the terms: I-will and I-can to refer to the relation of the subject to philosophical and political
freedom consequently. I-can indicates the subject’s ability to act in the political realm, while I-will
indicates subject’s internal willing of a thing that might be experienced inside only or might project
externally as well.
10
Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 55-63. In the discussion of the faculty of choice in Aristotle,
Arendt refers to De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics and Eudemien Ethics.
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II. A. Vita Activa and the Human Condition
II. A. 1. The Three Categories of Human Activity
Arendt argues that the Greeks experienced living through two realms only: the private
realm or household, and the public realm or polis. This sharp distinction of life into two
realms determined how Ancient Greeks interpreted and differentiated their activities, and
where they assigned the location of each. Human activities could be one of three main
types. First: activities subsumed under labor, which are the activities related to the
necessities of the body and the sustenance of life. Second: activities subsumed under
work, which are the activities related to making useful things. Third: activities subsumed
under action, which are the activities related to interacting with ones’ fellow men in the
polis by words and by deeds.11
Arendt asserts that the Greek life in the polis was characterized by assigning
every activity to its proper location. Labor, which corresponds to the necessities of life,
was kept inside the walls of the household (the private space) and was assigned mainly to
slaves. Work, which corresponds to making and to fabrication, was done in private spaces
by craftsmen, yet exhibited in public space, in the polis. Action, which corresponds to
interaction with ones’ free and equal fellows, was the political activity par excellence and
was the prerogative of freemen or citizens.12 These three categories were mentioned by
Aristotle in the Politics, where he states: “Life as a whole is divided …into occupation

11
12

Arendt, The Human Condition, 12, 28.
Ibid., 7-30.
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and leisure… and of matters involving action some are directed toward necessary and
useful things, others toward noble things.”13
Taking into consideration that by the term “action” in this passage Aristotle
denotes the human activity in general, it is conspicuous that he almost puts both the
categories of useful and necessary things on one side and noble things on the other.14 In
other words, Aristotle puts the slave, who bears the burden of maintaining life’s
necessities, and the craftsman, who makes useful things and artifacts, in close proximity.
However, he places the one who does “noble things” in a higher rank. He even holds that
the purpose of keeping the necessary and the useful is to facilitate and to make the life of
who does noble things possible. As he puts it: “…necessary and useful things [are taken
care of by slaves and craftsmen] for the sake of noble things.”15
The Aristotelian hierarchy denotes that the basic principle of division and ranking
is whether there is an equal choice for either doing or not-doing a particular activity. It is
recognizable that for the activities dictated by life necessities, there is no other choice but
to do them to ensure survival. Hence, the one who is devoted to this activity solely is
unfree and the activity itself is not noble.16 Moreover, the ranking of activities implies an
inescapable inequality between the individuals performing the activities. Those who are
busy satisfying the needs of the necessary and the making of the useful things are unequal
to those who are capable of devoting their lives to doing noble things. The ranking of the
three categories of human activities in general, and the highest rank given to the “noble
13

Aristotle, Politics, 1333a30.
This is not the position of Arendt. Arendt distinguishes sharply between the three types of activities and
deals with them separately.
15
Aristotle, Politics, 1333a35.
16
This is in the Aristotelian sense.
14
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things,” in particular, is what gave rise to the Aristotle’s conception of Bios Politikos,
which I shall discuss in the following sub-section.

II. A. 2. The Aristotelian Bios Politikos and Vita Activa
With the phrase Bios Politikos, Aristotle designates three main activities that could be
practiced freely. The activities of the Bios Politikos are all concerned solely with “the
beautiful.” A free man could adopt one of the three ways of life:
the life of enjoying bodily pleasures in which the beautiful, as it is given, is
consumed; the life devoted to the matters of the polis, in which excellence
produces beautiful deeds; and the life of the philosopher devoted to inquiry into,
and contemplation of, things eternal, whose everlasting beauty can neither be
brought about through the producing interference of man nor be changed through
his consumption of them.17
In this passage, Aristotle considers the way of life of the philosopher as of the same rank
as the way of life of the one who enjoys bodily pleasures and the one who is devoted to
matters of the polis even though “contemplation,” which is the main thing the
philosopher is busy with, does not seem to be an activity.
There are two points that could be inferred from the Aristotelian’s Bios Politikos.
First, the three activities are activities of free men in the polis or the public realm.
Second, Bios Politikos (or the life devoted to noble things), unlike the activities devoted
to the necessary and useful things, could be done or left undone without coercion. Thus,
the three activities all count for free acts. Praxis (action) and lexis (speech) are means of
action in the Aristotelian categories of Bios Politikos. And, hence, action and speech are
17

Arendt, The Human Condition, 13. Arendt did not refer to text-passage by Aristotle for this paraphrase
by her.
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of the same rank for the Greeks. Both were correlated with the free way of life that
slaves, women, and craftsmen were deprived of in order to enable the free life of who has
the potential to deal with the beautiful.
Bios Politikos was later translated in the Middle Ages as Vita Activa. Although it
kept “its original meaning: a life devoted to public-political matters”18 in Augustine’s
philosophy, it lost the Greek meaning in the late Middle Ages, at the exact moment when
“the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost.”19 Even later in the Middle
Ages, in the time of Thomas Aquinas, a pivotal inclusion and exclusion in the term took
place. Activities related to the necessary and the useful were included under the Vita
Activa, while contemplation (the philosopher’s peculiar way of life) was excluded from
the Vita Activa and it was given a special term of its own: Vita Contemplativa. Indeed,
Arendt points out that Vita Activa is synonymous, not with the Bios Politikos, but with
the Greek a-skholia (unquiet), which denoted all the ways of “noisy” life that absolutely
contradicted the quiet way of life of the philosopher (skhole).20
In fact, Hannah Arendt builds her concept of Vita Activa on the logical broad
division of human activities, which perfectly matches the conceptualization of the late
Middle Ages, as well. Additionally, she develops and refines the concept by correlating
each activity with the “basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to
man.”21 According to Arendt, Vita Activa is divided into three types: labor which relates
to life, work which relates to world, and action which relates to plurality.
18

Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 23.
20
Ibid., 15.
21
Ibid., 7.
19
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The Arendtian typology is quite different form the Aristotelian typology. Aristotle
does not create sharp distinctions between labor and work; however, Arendt does create a
very sharp distinction between these two categories. The basis of Aristotle’s typology is
the noble (beautiful) on the one hand versus the non-noble (useful and necessary) on the
other hand. The basis of Arendt’s typology is the human condition by which life on earth
has been given to man. Since Arendt identifies three human conditions for the human
existence on earth: life, world and plurality, there must be three human activities
correlating with the three human conditions. Arendt explains that:
Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human
body…the human condition of labor is life itself. Work is the activity which
corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence …work provides an
“artificial” world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings.
Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant
to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness.
Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the
intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of
plurality.22
Arendt also incorporates the Ancient Greeks’ meanings into her concept of action in
particular, and into her concept of Vita Activa more generally. For the Ancient Greeks as
well as for Arendt, labor which is entangled with cyclical and never-ending bodily needs
and work which is busy with fabrication and making artifacts, are not activities that
realize human freedom. The only activity that does realize freedom is the human activity
of Action, which is mainly conditioned by plurality. Neither labor nor work requires the
company of others. They might need to be facilitated by cooperation or by organization,

22

Ibid.
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but they are certainly not conditioned by continuous interaction with equal peers. Only
action involves human-to-human interaction without a medium in between.
The Arendtian theory of Vita Activa is very well received by the contemporary
political theorists; however, her trilogy: labor, work and action was criticized and debated
by scholars. For instance, Shiraz Dossa considers the order of the activities as quite
arbitrary:
The fundamental activities in the vita activa… are not related to each other in any
particular order of priority intrinsic to the vita activa itself. The order of
arrangement and the importance assigned to each activity depends wholly on the
judgement of the theorist assessing the vita activa.23
Although Dossa’s criticism is considerable, I disagree with him on his judgment that
Arendt is trying to put activities into an order or a hierarchy. In my opinion, Arendt’s
main concern is to locate activities, not to order them as the Aristotelian perspective
suggests. Her method in determining these activities is mainly logical and descriptive.24
We can easily agree with her that an artisan, for instance, finishes his/her craft in
isolation and exhibits it in the public realm. Similarly, we can agree with her that the
work of building a house has a certain beginning and a predictable end; the activity of
eating to maintain our bodies has no end until the moment of our death. Selya Benhabib
makes the same remark about Arendt’s concern with the location of human activities.
Benhabib also argues that “each type of human activity has a proper ‘place’ in which it
can be carried out. Labor, she [Arendt] claims, does not belong in the public realm,
23

Dossa, The Public Realm and the Public Self, 51.
Some literature studies Arendt as a phenomenologist, such as Moran, "Hannah Arendt: the
phenomenology of the public sphere." and Marder, “Natality, Event, Revolution: The Political
Phenomenology of Hannah Arendt.”
24
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whereas work, although often carried out in solitude, must display its product in
public.”25
Benhabib, admits that the sharp distinction between the three types of activities is
quite problematic. She even cites scholars who “have sought to show that her art of
making distinctions often obscured rather than illuminated the phenomena at hand.”26 In
an attempt to solve the problem, Benhabib suggests that this criticism of Arendt does not
take into account the more fundamental level that offers a basis for Arendt’s distinction,
which is her philosophical methodology of “phenomenological essentialism.”27 Benhabib
continues to clarify that this method leads usually to conflation between conceptual
distinctions and ontological analyses on one hand and social process and historical
descriptions on the other hand.28 According to Benhabib’s suggestion, the problematic
dimension of Arendt’s theory of Vita Activa is not because of her conceptual sharp
distinction of the three activities, but the problem arises from our confusion regarding the
identification of the level on which Arendt is operating on.29
Nevertheless, one could criticize Arendt easily by saying that the distinctions
simplify the human activity, which might tempt the reader to reduce every particular
activity into one single type: labor, work or action. Benhabib points out that this remark
has been made as a standard objection by scholars, who claim that “any complex human
activity, from factory work, to writing a book, to making a meal, cannot simply be seen

25

Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, 124.
Ibid., 123. Benhabib mentiones Hannah Pitkin, Jurgen Habermas, and Richard Bernstein.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 124.
29
Ibid.
26
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as an exemplar of a single action type.”30 Benhabib continues to back up this objection by
a number of examples that illustrate how complex the human activities are and how
impossible it is to reduce every human particular activity into a single type of activity.
She illustrates:
Industrial factory work, for example, is not just labor…depending on the nature of
the social relations of power on the shop floor, and between union and
management, there are usually complex dimensions of social interaction involved.
By building ten rather than fifteen chips per hour, workers may be engaging in a
slowdown of production. Their activity in this case would not be merely…labor;
it would also be political activity. Equally, writing a poem may appear as a case
of pure work in Arendtian terms…but if you are writing a poem as your weekly
addition to a comic strip that you despise, far from being satisfying work, this
activity may bear all the marks of drudgery alienated, industrial wage labor.
Finally, making a meal, the quintessential example of the repetitive, ephemeral
labor that serves the needs of the body in Arendt’s view, may be an expressive act
for a gourmet chef, just as it may be an act of love among two or more
individuals.31
I argue that this objection, while obvious and agreeable, is based on mixing the concept
of the type or the category with the concept of the particular or the real. The three types
of Vita Activa are categories, yet they are not real particulars. In other words, the three
types are analytical, not substantial. If the three types were real, there will be no need for
analyzing or classifying the human activities; neither there will be a justification for
Arendt’s main question of the human condition, which is to think what we are doing.
Based on this remark of the difference between the type and the particular, every
particular activity done in our very complex social and political context, such as writing a
book or making a meal, could not be wholly subsumed under one single category or type
of Vita Activa.
30
31

Ibid, 131.
Ibid., 131.
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In everyday life, we do not normally go straightforward in a linear way from
doing one type of activity into another type; this is very obvious. However, Arendt’s
typology allows us to be aware that there are up to three distinct types of activity
involved in every particular activity. I believe that accepting the typology of Vita Activa
and being aware of the three types involved explains and illuminates the complexity of
the phenomenon at hand; additionally, it helps us understand what we are doing, which is
the main concern of Arendt in the Human Condition.
Moreover, the correspondence of labor, work and action to the three dimensions
of human existence, which Arendt calls “conditions,” might help human beings not to
reduce their complex human existence into one dimension. For reducing one’s existence
into a single type of existence would have consequences in the form of losing the
meaning of one’s life, doing injustice to other people, or taking advantage of them. For
example, an individual who attempts to avoid labor and try to devote his life to action
entirely would turn into a parasite who lives at the expense of taking advantage of
someone else who is doing for him his labor and work. Similarly, an individual who is
forced to devote his/her life to labor only would turn into a means of sustenance of the
life of another group of people who might be devoted to either work and/or action. On a
contemporary societal level, taking Vita Activa as a pivotal concept in social justice
policies would help making sure that every individual/class/group in the society becomes
involved to some extent in the three activities, so his/her/its existence would not be

20

reduced into one aspect and would not be deprived from the complexity and the meaning
of human existence.32

II. A. 3. The Life and the World
Life is the human condition of labor, and plurality is the human condition of action, as
Arendt states.33 But people would not be able to live together in plurality unless they first
overcome the state of living amid nature. People could not found a body-politic according
to the principle of action while they are a part of nature, whose necessities deprive people
of their capacity to be free. People must distinguish themselves from mere life or nature
by making a world of their own; a world that is a product of their fabrication and which
can hold the prints of their existence or Dasein: of “being-there at a certain locality in
space and time,” in Heidegerian terms.34 The world is the man-made home amid the
wilderness of nature which is a home for the animal existence, but is not a home for
human existence. The things that the human beings fabricate in order to make earth a

32

While I was writing this part, I was following up the famine of Madaya, a syrian city under siege amid
the Syrian civil war. I contemplated the phenomenon from the perspective of Vita Activa and found that
while people in this small city are starving to death, i.e. lacking the human condition of labor; the main
reason which have lead into famine was not that they lacked food for the sustenance of their bodies.
However, the main reason was that there are two groups of people who are not acting together in order to
facilitate food transportation. Accordingly, the solution of the problem will be through action, not through
labor or work (such as collecting money for buying food for the starving people or making projects for food
production). Doing deeds such as mediating between the conflicting parties or acting by the means of
speech such as publishing, writing about Madaya to exert pressures on the parties will be the right activity
to do in this particular case.
You can find out about the case, here http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/09/middleeast/syria-madayastarvation/
33
Arendt, The Human Condition, 7.
34
Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, 52.
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home for themselves are what ensures “stability and solidity without which it could not
be relied upon to house the unstable and mortal creature which is man.”35
Neither do the activities of labor nor work ensure the ability to make a home for
human beings, because both of them do not have the thing-character that permits
durability, stability and relative independence from men, who are in continuous flux into
and from the world. What ensures relative stability and the making of a home is rather the
activity of work.36 Labor ensures the mere biological existence of human beings and it is
caught in the never-ending biological cycles, which begins with birth and ends with
death. In other words, labor is like the motor power that ensures our continuous living so
we can perform other activities that distinguish us from nature.
Arendt explains that “the word ‘life’…follows a strictly linear movement whose
very motion …is driven by the motor of biological life which man shares with other
living things and which forever retains the cyclical movement of nature.”37 She also adds
that “the biological process in man…is part of the cyclical movement of nature and
therefore endlessly repetitive; all human activities which arise out of the necessity to cope
with them are bound to the recurring cycles of nature and have in themselves no
beginning and no end.”38
Arendt argues that founding a body-politic, which is mainly achieved via people
acting together, is not possible until people get themselves out of the state of nature
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towards the state of culture.39 Hence, human beings could not jump directly from
labor/the state of nature/the mere life into action/founding a body-politic. They should
first separate themselves from nature by making their home out of the artifacts of their
hands, i.e. making the world. Action could not take place until there is a human habitat
that functions as its scene and medium. On the other hand, the thing-character of the
world and the durability of the things that human beings make by their hand is the source
or the basis of the objectivity of the world against the subjectivity of the makers. Arendt
illustrates the difference between the objectivity of the world and the eternal movement
of nature as follows:
Against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the man-made world
rather than the sublime indifference of the untouched nature, whose
overwhelming elementary force, on the contrary, will compel them to swing
relentlessly in the circle of their own biological movement…only we who have
erected the objectivity of a world of our own from what nature gives us, who have
built it into the environment of nature so that we are protected from her, can look
upon nature as something “objective” without a world between man and nature,
there is eternal movement, but not objectivity.40

The world, which is durable, objective, and relatively stable, serves a double function:
getting human beings out of the cyclical natural life and providing a medium for actions
to be laid over its relative stability: “this web [the fragile web of human relationships]
overlays the tangible objects of public world with a multiplicity of interpretations
emanating from different agents.”41
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II. A. 4. Natality and Mortality
The three human conditions, which render life on earth possible for human existence:
life, world and plurality, are further rooted in a more existential fundamental level, which
is the condition of both natality and mortality. Arendt states that “all activities and their
corresponding conditions are connected with the most general condition of human
existence: birth and death, natality and mortality.”42 Both natality and mortality are two
dimensions and conditions of human existence.
Arendt, in her analysis of the relation between philosophy and politics, claims that
philosophers usually emphasize the dimension of mortality over the dimension of
natality. They do not even give attention to the fact that we are natals as much as we are
mortals; i.e. we can be defined as natal beings as we are defined as mortal beings as
well.43 Also, the fact of death is overvalued in philosophy over the fact of birth, in
Arendt’s estimation. This attitude of philosophers towards life and death, which is an
attitude of ignoring birth and liking death, started with Plato’s Phaedo, where he decides
that “the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for
dying and death.”44 Arendt comments on the philosopher’s attitude towards dying by
saying that “death, being the separation of body and soul, is welcome to him; he is
somehow in love with death, because the body, with all its demands, constantly interrupts
the soul’s pursuits.”45 Because of this stance of philosophers, generally, Arendt remarks
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that “the true philosopher does not accept the conditions under which life has been given
to man.”46 In other words, Arendt wants to say that the philosopher does not accept the
condition of natality; and hence, he values death over life.
The tradition of valuing death over life or not accepting all human conditions of
existence, which started with Plato, and never stopped in the philosophical tradition, was
not challenged until Arendt came up with the notion of natality as a no less important
category than the category of mortality. She theorizes it as the more important ontological
category of labor, work and action. She said:
labor and work, as well as, action, are also rooted in natality in so far as they have
the task to provide and preserve the world for, to foresee and reckon with, the
constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as stranger.47

According to Arendt, the most important activity that is connected to natality is the
activity of action because, as we will see later, she equates action with beginning, which
is rooted in the human condition of natality. In the following passage of Arendt, she will
not only clarify how the category of natality is the central category of the political action,
but also she will decide on the essential difference between political and metaphysical
thought. She states that:
Action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the
newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.
In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality is
inherent in all human activities. Moreover, since action is the political activity par
excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of the political
as distinguished form metaphysical, thought.48
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Natality and mortality means, in another way, that we are just visitors on the earth. We
are born and become caught up in the cyclical biological processes of life that ensures our
continuous existence. Then, if we do not do anything that transcend this necessary and
natural cycle, we will live and die like animals.49 We will leave the universe with no trace
behind us that tells we have lived before on earth. We will disappear without a proof of
our Dasein, of being-there at a particular space and time. This reflection upon the
condition of natality and mortality, of being mere visitors on the earth, is very
frightening. Even if we find salvation in religion and do good deeds as religions always
prescribe to their followers, how can these good deeds be ascribed to its doers, so that
they can be remembered? How can they be saved from the “natural ruin of time”50 and be
saved from its fleeting character? Is there any possibility for a mortal being to became,
even relatively, an immortal being?

II. A. 5. Immortality and the Common
Human beings in ancient times seemed aware of the apparent fact that they were the only
mortals in an immortal and everlasting universe. We “move along rectilinear line in a
universe where everything…moves in a cyclical order.”51 The awareness of the fact that
the life of an individual is a linear path between birth and death became overwhelming
very early. The question of how can the existence of mortal human beings, not as species,
but as distinct individuals, be transformed into immortal existence, became very
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concerning. How can mortals be immortals who can endure in time and enjoy deathless
life?52
The Greek’s solution to this human concern is the Aristotelian remark that there is
a “possibility for immortalizing” for the realm of human affairs.53 He argues in his Ethics
that “…one should not follow those who advise us to think human thoughts since we are
human, and mortal thoughts, since we are mortal, but as far as possible one ought to be
immortal…”54 Arendt adds that the insistence on immortality occurs very often in
Aristotle’s political writings.55 The possibility of immortality and of creating lasting and
enduring existence, which saves the human existence from its futility, would be the
existential spring and the motivation for creating the common or the public realm where
people can constitute reality to their existence. They can give their futile and originally
mortal existence an immortal dimension by appearing as actors whose words can be
heard and whose deeds can be seen. They can also exhibit the artifacts they made and
they can be known as the makers of beautiful and useful things that could potentially last
after they have died.
Therefore, we can conclude with Arendt that, immortality is the center and the
spring of Vita Activa.56 We can understand from her implications that “without this
transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no
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common world and no public realm, is possible.”57 According to the private and the
public domains of Vita Activa, Arendt clarifies that the term “public” signifies two related
yet not identical phenomena. The first meaning of the public is almost identical with the
meaning of appearance and reality. Arendt defines it as “everything that appears in public
[that] can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us,
appearance…constitutes reality.”58 The second meaning is almost identical to the
meaning of the world that is constituted from our fabrication and the human affairs
altogether. She defines it as follows:
The term ‘public’ signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us
and distinguished from our privately own place in it. This world, however, is not
identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of
men and the general condition of organic life, it is related, rather, to the human
artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as, to affairs which go on among
those who inhabit the man-made world together.59
Having explained the ontological roots of Vita Activa and the existential origin of the
common, I shall explain how the human condition of plurality could be manifested in a
public realm, in order for action to take place. In other words, how can a plurality of
people exist in the public realm, so that they can act together in an organized way? I
shall, as well, clarify how action and the human condition of plurality are inherent only in
freedom.
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II. B. The Political, Action and Freedom
It would be very difficult to discuss separately the three categories of the political, the
action, and freedom, because none of them could exist without the other. Arendt argues
that action and freedom are the only main constituents of the concept of the political. The
reason for the very existence of the body-politic is freedom; and freedom in turn has its
realization in action. Arendt maintains that “the raison d’être of politics is freedom, and
its field of experience is action.”60 Therefore, Arendt, like the Ancient Greeks, has a very
definite and relatively narrow meaning of the political. From the three cardinal human
activities –labor, work and action– action alone is what counts as a political activity.
Action in turn is the only human activity characterized by freedom. Arendt claims that
“freedom…is actually the reason that men live together in political organization at all.
Without it, political life as such would be meaningless.”61 Consequently, in the coming
discussion, one should bear in mind that the Arendtian concept of politics takes its
connotations from the Ancient Greek experience, which has almost the inverted meaning
of what we take to be the political in modern times.62

II. B. 1. The Human Condition of Plurality and the Public Realm
Action is determined by the human condition of plurality. No human being could act
alone, as Arendt clarifies. She states that “action… is never possible in solitude or

60

Arendt, “What is Freedom?,” 146.
Ibid.
62
Arendt considers the modern state as a gigantic household that is necessary to keep life, but not by any
means a body-politic for the freedom of its members. Arendt, The Human Condition, 28. She believes that
what is left for the political in the modern age is the field of International Relation.
61

29

isolation; one man alone needs, at the very least, the help of others to carry through
whatever his enterprise may be.”63 For action to take place, agents should act in the
“public realm,” which is an organized space for human interaction to take place. Arendt
stresses that although the other two human conditions, life and world, have some relation
to politics, the human condition of “plurality is specifically the condition –not only the
conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam—of all political life.”64
Not every human community secures a public realm for action and freedom.
Hence, not every community counts as a body-politic, and not every human community
knows that the concept of the political is associated solely with freedom. For example,
tribes and dynasties are not politically organized communities; thus, although they are
communities, they do not count for body-politic. The principle of the formation of tribes
and dynasties is mainly labor, the need to preserve life and its necessities. Arendt
explains that “where men live together but do not form a body-politic,… the factors
ruling their actions and conduct are not freedom but the necessities of life and concern of
its preservation.”65 Interaction between its members does not count for action and thus for
freedom because these communities do not organize public space in which freedom could
have an appearance. In other words, if a collective of human beings needs to preserve its
life and existence only, there will be no need for founding a body-politic.
The Greek polis, which came into existence before the Socratic school of
philosophy was born, is an exemplar for a body-politic that is built upon and is organized
63
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according to the principles of freedom and the public realm. As the human activities of
labor, work and action were differentiated and distinguished in the Greek polis, the
location of these activities was demarcated as well. Life was divided into the household
and the polis, or the private and the public realms.66 All activities of labor were taken care
of in the household or the private realm; and all activities of Action took place in the
polis or the public realm. Therefore, a Greek citizen had to traverse the sharp distinction
between the public and the private realms every day. Arendt asserts this division and
distinction because it is decisive in understanding the Greek conception of freedom and
politics. She elaborates:
At the root of Greek political consciousness we find an unequalled clarity and
articulateness in drawing this distinction. No activity that served only the purpose
of making a living, of sustaining only the life process, was permitted to enter the
political realm, and this at the grave risk of abandoning trade and manufacture to
the industriousness of slaves and foreigners.67
Hence, freedom, solely, is the only justification for founding a polis and creating a public
realm sterile from the activities of labor and work and devoted to human-to-human
interaction. Arendt points out that this very character of the polis, being founded
according to the principle of freedom, was reflected in the political philosophies of Plato
and Aristotle, even though the description of both of these suggests that the borderline
between the household and the polis was infrequently blurred. For instance, Plato “began
to draw his examples and illustrations for the polis from everyday experiences in private
life.”68 On the other hand, Aristotle “tentatively assumes that at least the historical origin
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of the polis must be connected with the necessities of life and that only its content or
inherit aim (telos) transcends life in the “good life.”69
The crucial differences between the household and the polis, which are
noteworthy for its inherent relation to the concept of freedom, includes the type of human
activities performed in each, which I have discussed, and the type of interaction between
the members of each. In the household, everything is done by a command from the
master and by the obedience of slaves and women to assure maintaining and sustaining
necessary needs for the members of the household. In other words, the type of interaction
in the private realm is rulership or governance whose main principle is command and
obedience. Rulership gave rise to an inequality and a hierarchy in the household with the
master/free man at the top and the slave/unfree man at the bottom. Moreover, rulership
justified using coercion and violence in order to preserve necessities.70 Arendt explains
that “because all human beings are subject to necessity, they are entitled to violence
toward others; violence is the pre-political act of liberating oneself from the necessity of
life.”71 Because of rulership, governing by command and obedience, which entails
violence, the household was by definition not a space for realizing freedom. Human
interaction in the polis was completely opposed to the one in the household. The main
principle of interaction was not command and obedience between unequals, but action by
word and deed between equals. Persuasion by word and deed in the polis pre-empted the
69
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coercion of command. The polis was the location where equal citizens realize their
freedom in action, i.e. in speech and deed, “…to be free meant both not to be subject to
the necessity of life or to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It
meant neither to rule nor to be ruled.”72
The household and the polis share the similarity of being conditions and
requirements of freedom for equal fellows. The household/ private realm liberates the
free man from the necessities of life; and the polis/the public realm provides him with an
organized space for the communication and interaction with equal fellow men by words
and deeds. Arendt argues that:
… in order to be free, man must have liberated himself from the necessities of
life. But the status of freedom did not follow automatically upon the act of
liberation. Freedom, needed, in addition to liberation, the company of other men
who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them-a
politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could
insert himself by word and deed.73
The way the Greeks organized their space of existence, their body-politic, helps
us to understand that in the Greek case, freedom is related to how they understood their
relation to the space they inhabited. Freedom was a state of a body whose ability to move
should be guaranteed and facilitated, i.e. by protecting it from being enforced by
command and from being coerced by its own needs of preservation. Arendt states that
“freedom was understood to be the free man’s status, which enabled him to move, to get
away from home, to go out into the world and meet other people in deed and word.”74 It
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is also obvious that freedom is not possible for everyone in the polis. The freedom of
some, the slaves and women, is sacrificed for the freedom of others, the freemen or the
citizens in the Greek conception.

II. B. 2. Action and Freedom
Action is the field of the experience of freedom, as Arendt proves. For a freeman to
realize his freedom, he should be an agent among other equal and distinct agents. Action
has two modes or two forms in the Greek polis: deeds (acts) or words (speech). Action
has no end. Nevertheless, it has a result in the form of a story that could be narrated and
remembered. Ultimately, the story is weaved in history, the storybook of the human
mankind. Although action has no thing-character for action does not end in an ultimate
end product as work does, it certainly has an inter-subjective or “subjective in-between”75
reality that has an appearance insofar as the words are heard and the deeds are seen.
Consequently, freedom, because it is no more than the ability to act, would have both an
appearance and a reality.76 Arendt clarifies that “the subjective in-between is not tangible
… but … this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in
common.”77
Arendt argues that no form of communication needs speech more than action.
Every other human interaction could be mediated with a minimum of language; even sign
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language could suffice to get labor or work done.78 On the other hand, speech is
indispensable for action, not to mention that speech itself is already an action. Most
conspicuously, “finding [and uttering] the right word at the right moment, quite apart
from the information or communication they may convey, is action.”79 Therefore, in the
Greek polis, speech and action were conceived as “coeval and equal, of the same rank
and the same kind.”80 Beside the inherent character of action in speech, acting together
would not be possible without self-disclosure. Speech lets us know who we are and lets
other fellows know who we are. Without disclosing ourselves and answering the question
“who we are,” we would not be able to act together because action happens in-between
distinct disclosed agents who have appearances.81 Even though agents in the public realm
are equal, they are distinct and different and “…speech corresponds to the fact of
distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living
as a distinct and unique being among equals.”82
If speech is correlated with the human condition of distinct plurality, action is
correlated with the human condition of natality.83 Arendt considers natality, not mortality,
as “the central category of the political.”84 As natals, newcomers born into the world,
they need to disclose who they are and insert themselves in the world by word and deed.
Arendt calls the agent’s insertion into the world a second birth.85 What is common
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between biological and political birth is the fact of beginning. Birth, by definition, is a
beginning, whether it’s a beginning in nature (the biological) or a beginning in the world
(the political). This is what Arendt concludes from the etymological analysis of the Greek
language, which she takes as self-interpreting for the practical political experiences of the
Greeks.
According to Arendt, there were two different, but inter-related, words for “to
act” in the Greek language: archein and prattein. Archein means “to begin,” “to lead,”
and eventually “to rule,” while prattein means “to pass through,” “to achieve,” “to
finish.” In Latin, these words were rendered respectively as “agere,” which means to set
something in motion, and “gerere,” which means the enduring and supporting
continuation of past acts. 86 The twofold meaning of “to act” as related to politics was
interpreted by Arendt in the following passage:
In both instances, action occurs in two different stages; the first stage is a
beginning by which something new comes into the world. The Greek word…
which covers beginning, leading, ruling, that is, the outstanding qualities of the
free man, bears witness to an experience in which being free and the capacity to
begin something new coincided. Freedom, as we would say today, was
experienced in spontaneity. The manifold meaning …indicates the following:
only those could begin something new who were already rulers (i.e. household
heads who ruled over slaves and family) and had thus liberated themselves from
the necessities of life for enterprises in distant lands or citizenship in the polis; in
either case, they no longer ruled, but were rulers among rulers, moving among
their peers, whose help they enlisted as leaders in order to begin something new,
to start a new enterprise; for only with the help of others could the…. ruler,
beginner and leader, really act,… carry through whatever he had started to do.87
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The achievement or the finishing, indicated by the second meaning of the word, is by no
means an end product or a thing. The action has no end, but it is an end in itself.88 Having
no end, action, by definition, is fleeting in character.89 Speech and deeds could fly away
with no proof that they had existed sometime in the past. The fleeting character of action
requires the constant presence of others, the witnesses, who would testify, recognize and
then narrate the story of the great deeds and words.90 Story preserves actions from losing
their reality, and bears witness that, one day, they happened and were heard in words and
seen in deeds.
Unprecedented actions would give rise to unprecedented happenings, to events
which challenge all expectations based on causality and present themselves in the guise
of miracle.91 Being able to act, to begin, to cause something new to happen that was
unprecedented before, to challenge the laws of causality and to begin a causality of ones’
own is Freedom. Thus, freedom in its political origin was mainly constituted in the Ican.92 In the ability to utter words and to perform deeds, this might give rise to an event
and would deserve to be told in a story. Freedom is constituted in the ability of the Agent.
If I can, I am free; if I cannot, I am not free. Arendt asserts that:
…this is the realm [public realm] where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in
words which can be heard, in deeds which can be seen, and in events which are
talked about, remembered and turned into stories before they are finally
incorporated into the great story book of human history.93
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In addition, Arendt believes that unpredictability is an inherent character in action; hence,
the actor should free himself from intentions and motivations as well as from aims and
consequences; otherwise, he would be implementing a plan, which has an end (his aim)
and he will not be acting with others, but he will be using them as means for his end.
Kohn comments on this insight by saying that “if we knew what we were doing when we
act we would not be free but enacting or unfolding a plan.”94

II. C. Time and the Faculty of Choice
Arendt has a strong argument that “freedom as related to politics is not a phenomenon of
the will.”95 Greeks did not discover the faculty of the Will that we usually conceive, in
the modern age, as a spring of action.96 Action was not subjective in the Greek
experience, but inter-subjective, represented in words and acts that networked the agents
together. The point that might be perplexing here, as pointed out by Arendt, is that the
Greeks experienced voluntary and involuntary acts as well as intended and unintended
acts. She asks the question in this form: “How Greek philosophy dealt with phenomena
and data of human experience that our post-classical ‘conventions’ have been accustomed
to ascribe to the will as the mainspring of action?”97 Arendt, then, turned to Aristotle
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because he recognized “the lacuna in Greek language and thought regarding the faculty
of will” as no word existed for the faculty of Will.98
Arendt explains that volition is different from willing. Willing is directed towards
the future, and thus towards projects that have not yet existed. However, volition occurs
between two or more existing objects at hand.99 The faculty that makes volition possible
is a faculty of choice, not a faculty of willing. It is practical reason or proairesis, as
Aristotle conceptualized.100
The faculty of Choice is mainly concerned with means, not with ends, since the
end is already designated. For the Greeks, the end of the Agent was eudaimonia or
happiness, which no one directly chooses, but rather pursues through chosen means.
Arendt interprets the question of ends and choice by the Greeks as follows: “Nobody
deliberates and chooses health or happiness as his aim, though we may think about them;
ends are inherent in human nature and the same for all.”101 The faculty of choice “decides
between things equally possible and given to us, as it were, in statu nascendi as mere
potentialities.”102 Choice has no capacity to create a new possibility; it is a mere arbiter
between several possibilities.103
The reason Arendt refers to for which the Greeks did not discover the faculty of
Will is their concept of time. Will is an organ of the future; and future is plausible only if
the time is conceived as a rectilinear line that has a definite beginning and a definite end.
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The Greeks did not have such a concept of time because they conceived the universe as
immortal having neither a beginning nor an end. The mathematical form which has no
beginning and no end is the circle. Therefore, their time concept was cyclical. Moreover,
Arendt argues that the emergence of the cyclical time concept was inevitable on the
background of discovering an everlasting being, birthless and deathless.104 Everything for
the Greeks was revolving, happening again and again in a circular manner. Even “Events
and doxai ás, they occur among men, revolve not only once or a few times but infinitely
often.”105
In fact, the Aristotelian categories of potentiality and actuality are good
representatives of the cyclical time concept. The potential exists in a dormant form,
which needs a cause to bring it into being. Potentiality is one of the causes of everything
real and the future is always a consequence of the past, as Arendt notes.106 In the frame of
the cyclical time concept, nothing completely new would be introduced into the world.
To recapitulate, Arendt argues that the political freedom was experienced in the
Greek polis as an objective quality of the body and an inter-subjective reality in the polis
of which the recognized chief units are the equal citizens.107 Freedom has both an
appearance and a reality in the body-politic or the polis; however, it was not a
manifestation of the faculty of Will, for the Greeks did not discover such a faculty.
Freedom, in the polis, was an experience associated with the ability to act with other
equal fellows. In other words, freedom was a phenomenon of the I-can, not the I-will.
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III

PHILOSOPHICAL FREEDOM

III. A. The Concept of Time and the Concept of Inner Life
Arendt insists that the human mind could acquire and develop new faculties throughout
the course of history.108 She dates the discovery of the faculty of the Will to the human
experience of religious conversion, specifically the conversion of Paul in the first century
A.D. as well as the rise of “popular philosophy” by which she refers to Stoicism and the
related doctrines. Both Christianity and Stoicism led eventually to the discovery of an
inner life of man, where he could experience an internal freedom in solitude. That is, an
experience of freedom whose existence is testified only by the one who experiences it.
Christianity, on the other hand, reversed the relation between man and the world.
The world is no longer everlasting and immortal. Man, as well, is no longer a mortal
being whose life is transient in the world as the Ancient Greek world-view suggested.109
In Christianity, the relation is reversed and an authentic future could be hoped for or
feared from “you who have believed that men die but that the world is everlasting need
only turnabout, to a faith that the world comes to an end but that you yourself will have
an everlasting life.”110 Because of this inversion, an inner life for man was possible and
the question of faith, rightness and struggle to master the inner life became relevant.
A new concept of time, entailed in the new Christian world-view is a second
decisive factor that contributes to the discovery of the faculty of will. Elisabeth YoungBruehl agrees also on the decisiveness of the concept of time for the discovery of the
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Will. She explains that “the lack of a notion of will among the Greeks and the
achievement of such a notion among the Christians were tied to time concepts.”111
According to the Christian world-view, the universe is created; hence, it has an
absolute beginning. The universe will come to an absolute definite end as well. Since the
mathematical form that has a beginning and an end is the line, the new concept of time
that corresponds to a view of the World, with a beginning and an end, is the rectilinear
time concept. Therefore, the ancient cyclical concept of time that was congruous with the
circular movement of life and nature could be preempted with the rectilinear time
concept. Not only the creed or the faith of creation determines a beginning and end for
the world, but also “the story that begins with Adam’s expulsion from Paradise and ends
with Christ’s death and resurrection is a story of a unique, unrepeatable event.”112
Arendt notices that the story’s events could not be repeated again and again in a
circular manner: “the story’s sequence presupposes a rectilinear time concept; it has a
definite beginning, a turning point -the year one of our calendar- and a definite end.”113
The concept of future and the possible events that might come with it changes
accordingly from an inauthentic event that already existed in the past in the status of
potentiality (using the circular time concept) to an authentic tense, which brings about
events that have never existed in the past (using the rectilinear time concept). Such new
concept of time hardly touched the secular events in the medieval period, as Arendt
observes.114 Nevertheless, it was indispensable for the discovery of the faculty of will for
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the Will is “our mental organ for the future.”115 Indeed, without the possibility of
authentic future that could carry noble events, there would be no need for a faculty of
Will. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl also observes this relation by stating that:
…when thinkers emphasize the past within the context of a cyclical time theory that is, when future is seen as an actualization or consequence of the past- no
mental “organ” for the future, no Will, is posited; but, on the other hand, when
they emphasize the future within the context of a rectilinear time theory-that is,
when unique events are brought to be possible- an “organ” for the future is
considered essential.116

Given the new possibility of an internal life and the new possibility of a genuine future
that could be a harbinger of novel events, a new experience of freedom ascribed to the
Will was possible: the freedom of the Will, or philosophical freedom.117 Neither
philosophical nor political freedom were born in the philosophical tradition; however, the
fact that a mental faculty had been discovered and with which freedom could be ascribed
to, in addition to its being experienced in solitude, made the freedom of the Will eligible
to be subjected to philosophical speculation.
Political freedom, on the other hand, was not eligible for philosophical
investigation, for it is conditioned by plurality. Arendt upholds that the main feature of
philosophy, in its historical tradition, is its concern with man in his singularity, and not
his plurality. She argues that:
It lies in the nature of philosophy to deal with man in the singular, whereas
politics could not even be conceived of if men did not exist in the plural. Or to put
it another way: the experiences of the philosopher- insofar as he is a philosopher115
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are with solitude, while for man- insofar as he is political-solitude is an essential
but nevertheless marginal experience.118
Hence, philosophical freedom as an attempt to exercise freedom in singularity was a hope
of redemption for people, who were exempted from the elite class of citizens. Freedom in
plurality was not guaranteed for everyone, and is, as well, conditioned by the consent of
the multitude to grant and secure the freedom of the movement of the body.

III. B. The Discovery of the Will
Since the discovery of the Will is datable, Arendt’s method in tackling the faculty of Will
is historical. 119 Arendt dates the discovery of the Will to the Apostle Paul. She states that
“the Will and its necessary Freedom in all their complexity were first discovered by
Paul.”120 Concomitant with Paul’s conversion and preaching on behalf of Christianity,
Epictetus, who was a freed slave, was also able to discover the Will and its capacities
through a rather different experience with Stoicism.
After Paul and Epictetus raised the complexities of the Will, Augustine, the first
philosopher of the Will, as Arendt labels him, attempted to solve the problems of the Will
by transforming it into love. Eight centuries later, in the Middle Ages, Aquinas and Duns
Scotus were interested in contending over the problems of the Will, not in isolation, but
in its relation to the intellect. These contentions were the exact problem of free will,
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which Arendt affirms. She elaborates that we should not be mistaken by the synonymous
discussions in relation to the problem of freedom, in the political sense.
Arendt abstracts two general historical human experiences that brought about the
Will and its alleged freedom. The first, is the human experience in demand of voluntary
submission to the Divine law; i.e. obedience vs. disobedience to the Divine law in
theological terms. Arendt extrapolates this fundamental statement as follows:
…it was the experience of an imperative demanding voluntary submission that led
to the discovery of the Will, and inherent in this experience was the wondrous fact
of a freedom that none of the ancient peoples-Greek, Roman, or Hebrew- had
been aware of, namely, that there is a faculty in man by virtue of which,
regardless of necessity and compulsion, he can say “Yes” or “No,” agree or
disagree with what is factually given, including his own self and his existences,
and that this faculty may determine what he is going to do.121

And the second experience is the experience whereby freedom becomes a problem; i.e.
“when men begin to doubt the coincidence of the Thou-shalt and the I-can…the question
arises: Are things that concern only me within my power.”122 Both of these experiences
are manifested in the experience of Apostle Paul.

III. B. 1. Paul and Epictetus
Paul noticed that law is hard to fulfill. Thus, while there is a will to fulfill the law, the real
ability of the agent for fulfilment is diminished.123 In other words, there is an “I cannot”
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regarding the commands of law even if the agent has the “I will.” In addition, the
voluntary submission required by the law from its followers implies that there is a
possibility of refusal to voluntary submission to the law, i.e. the will might will (submit
voluntarily to the law) or might nill (refuse to submit to the law). Arendt explains that
Paul discovered the two-in-one that Socrates had discovered previously.124 However,
while the Socratic two-in-one is in friendship and is indispensable for a solitary dialogue
or thinking, the two-in-one of Paul is problematic, because the split between the mental
willing and the real ability would incite a conflict between the I-will and the I-can, or the
I-will and the I-nill.
Paul does not see any possible solution to the conflict within the range of human
capacity, “so that even if the law is obeyed and fulfilled, there remains this inner
resistance.”125 Only divine grace can resolve the conflict and give peace to the Will.
Hence, for Paul, the Will is utterly impotent “because it hinders itself”126 and it requires
divine salvation.
Concomitantly, Epictetus’s philosophy was interested in making the freedom of
the slave possible. How could one be a slave in the world and still feel free? It seems also
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that Epictetus was not troubled with the conflict of the demand of the submission to law,
but he was more concerned with the problem of inability in the outer world.127
Epictetus discovered that the mind could retain outward “impressions”; and, thus,
it could deal with the outside things as mere data of consciousness.128 For him, man has
no power over the outward world; yet, he is gifted with mental capacities that enable him
to represent the outward world in his own inwardness. This implies that man is able to
rule over himself and over what concerns him only.129 Epictetus continues to argue, as
Arendt explains, that reason teaches the will what is within the limit of will’s power and
what is outside of its power. Accordingly, the Will has the sovereign decision to
command itself to do only that which is within the scope of its power. It restricts itself to
exercise its sovereignty in inwardness only. When the will is entirely capable of
mastering and ruling the inwardness state, man will be indifferent and invulnerable to the
outside circumstances and miseries.
The status of limiting oneself to live in inwardness and to withdraw from the
outside world demands continuous training. This is for two reasons: first, “man lives his
ordinary life in the world as it is,” and second, “his inside itself is located within some
outside, a body that is not in his power but belongs to outside things.”130 Nonetheless,
despite the hardness of keeping this training in the face of the miseries of the outside
reality and the vulnerability of the human body, the man, who succeeds in training his
will to “will what happens anyhow” and to “will what is” and “thus never be at odds with
127
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outward things,”131 would achieve the status of invulnerability or atarxia. While Paul
concludes from his experience that the will is impotent, Epictetus concludes that the will
is omnipotent for its sovereignty over itself, because nothing could hinder the Will other
than itself and its capability to bracket reality.

III. B. 2. Unifying the Will
Augustine, the first philosopher of the Will, went beyond Apostle Paul and Epictetus. In
Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s philosophy, she explains his claim in which he states
that the Will might will and might find no obstacle to realize its willing. Nevertheless, it
still might not be able to perform. “It is possible to will and, in the absence of any outside
hindrance still be unable to perform!”132 Thus, Augustine is critical of Stoicism. He
noticed that saying no to reality was not enough for tranquility.133 He also remarked that
the willed submissiveness regarding the Divine law presupposes a severe limitation on
the willing capacity itself. Even the creed of belief in “creation” exerts more limitation on
the willing capacity. In fact, “no created being can will against creation, for this would be
a will directed not only against a counter-will, but also against the very existence of the
willing or nilling subject.”134 For this extreme inability of the Will, Augustine is against
the Will’s omnipotence; and he claims that the Will needs redemption.
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Augustine demands that “a good man ought to conform his will to the divine will,
so that he wills what God wills.”135 In addition; he believes, like Paul and Epictetus, that
the Will is spilt and thus is in conflict with itself. This is attested by the very fact that the
Will always speaks in imperatives: “Thou shalt will.”136 It is in the nature of the Will to
command and to demand obedience. It is as well in its nature to be resisted.137 Augustine,
and Paul, seeks resolution to the conflict of the Will, but, Augustine seeks to resolve the
division by reuniting the divided will and by transforming it into Love.138 Although the
transformation remained mysterious, as Arendt states, she concludes “…he diagnoses the
ultimate unifying will that eventually decides a man’s conduct as Love.”139

III. B. 3. Who was willing to pay the price?
Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, who came eight centuries after Augustine, were not
interested in the Will per se and its own structure as an isolated faculty, but they were
interested in its relation to the intellect and whether it is of higher rank with respect to the
intellect.140
Thomas assembled all faculties: Will, Choice, Intellect and Reason in one system.
Arendt explains that he assembled the four faculties in the following manner: the two
apprehensive faculties (the Intellect and the Will) and the two appetitive faculties (the
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Reason and the Choice) work together in harmony in one system and for an ultimate
universal end. In the pursuit of the universal end “as the intellect has reasoning as its
subordinate power for dealing with the particulars, the Will has free choice as its
subservient helper in sorting out appropriate particular means to a universal end.”141
Despite the fact that both faculties, the Intellect and the Will, pursue the same universal
end, which is Being (truth and good), the faculty of Intellect, according to Aquinas has
primacy over the Will, because the intellect’s end is truth and truth compels; yet, it does
not coerce. On the other hand, the end of the Will is good; and the good does not compel;
yet, the Will commands and coerces towards doing the good.142

III. B. 3. a. Autonomy and Limitation
Contrary to Aquinas, Duns Scotus decides that the Will is nobler and higher in rank than
the Intellect for the Will is able to resist “the needs of desire on the one hand, and the
dictates143 of intellect and reason, on the other.”144 Scotus recognizes the Will as an
independent faculty from the things as they are; and he acknowledges that the only
limitation of the Will is that “it cannot deny Being all together.”145 Therefore, the Will
can set limits to reason; however, it cannot limit the power of nature, whether the nature
of the inner man, his inclinations, or the nature of the exterior circumstances.
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Despite this limitation, Scotus insists that even in this case, the Will can still
exercise its omnipotence, by refusing to submit to the coercion of nature or necessity. The
exercise would be a mental exercise only. Arendt explains this mental freedom in the
following passage:
The Will’s autonomy… decisively limits the power of reason…but it does not
limit the power of nature, be it the nature of the inner man, called ‘inclination,’ or
that of exterior circumstances. The will is by no means omnipotent in its actual
effectiveness: its force consists solely in that it cannot be coerced to will. To
illustrate this mental freedom, Scotus gives the example of a man ‘who hurls
himself from a high place’…while man is necessarily falling, compelled by the
law of gravity, he remains free to continue ‘to will to fall,’ and can also of course
change his mind, in which case he would be unable to undo what he started
voluntarily and would find himself in the hands of necessity.”146
III. B. 3. b. The Characteristic of the Will
Arendt cherishes Duns Scotus among all philosophers. She believes that he is the only
philosopher who is willing to pay the price of contingency for the gift of freedom.147 She
writes “…his quintessential thought-contingency, the price gladly paid for freedom- he
had neither predecessors nor successors.”148
Duns Scotus believes that the Will’s main characteristic regarding freedom is that
its openness to contraries, namely, the Will can will the thing and its opposite at the same
time. Arendt quotes Scotus: “it is in the power of our will to will and to nill, which are
contraries, with respect to the same object.”149 Scotus asserts the idea that, as quoted by
Arendt, “the essential characteristic of our volitional act is … the power to choose
146
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between opposite things and to revoke the choice once it has been made.”150 The attribute
of openness to contraries at the same time is peculiar to the Will. Neither desire nor
intellect can side with the Will regarding this criterion. Arendt interprets Duns Scotus as
follows: “An object presented to desire can only attract or repel, and an issue presented to
the intellect can only be affirmed or negated. But it is the basic quality of our will that we
may will or nill the object presented by reason or desire.”151
As a consequence to the ability of the Will to will and nill a particular object at
the same time, the Will is able to suspend a second volition. The ability of the mind to
suspend the second volition is the very test of freedom. Arendt affirms that: “[suspension]
is an important testimony to human freedom, to the mind’s ability to avoid all coercive
determination from outside.”152 Simply, the Will knows that it could have willed the
object that it actually nilled with no coercion. Scotus also confirms that “[the willing ego
knows that] a decision actually taken need not have been taken and a choice other than
the one actually made might have been made.”153

III. B. 3. c. The Unconditional Bias to Freedom
Arendt depicts Scotus as a rescuer of human freedom. In every argument freedom is
endangered because it confronts either the Divine providence or the law of causality.
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Scotus makes choices and builds arguments to protect freedom. Indeed, his position on
contingency and the primacy of the Will is for the sake of saving freedom.154
We discussed earlier how Arendt interprets the letters of Paul and the philosophy
of Augustine as doubting the human competency, and hence, seeking the Divine
redemption to the split will. Scotus, unlike Paul and Augustine, finds no need for the
Divine interference to redeem the split will. Scotus admits that all of man’s natural
capabilities “follow the laws laid down by divine Fiat.”155 Therefore, he neither sees
contradiction between free will and nature, because man is part and parcel of nature; nor
does he see contradiction between free will and the Divine providence, because man was
created in God’s image.156
For Scotus, Will cannot nill the Being altogether as stated before. Thus, freedom
of the Will is limited. Nevertheless, the Will still has the capacity to freely affirm, negate,
love or hate whatever confronts it without being coerced by any cause of coercion, 157
whether it was an outside coercion or it was the coercion of another inside mental faculty,
namely: desire or reasoning.158
Freedom in Scotus has a limitation and a capacity: a limitation of a man who is
created and subjected to God’s Will, and a capacity to have unconditional position from
being. In other words, to love a being is a position, to hate a being is a position, and to
deny or to accept a being is a position. All these positions are taken freely. According to
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Scotus, as Arendt interprets him, nothing could coerce the Will to take a particular
position; even if there is an external coercion, the Will still could not be coerced!

III. B. 3. d. Causality and Contingency
Free will was problematic, not only because of its apparent contradiction with the Divine
providence, but also because of the law of causality. Arendt explains that “theoretically,
the trouble has always been that Free Will… seems utterly incompatible, not just with
divine providence, but with the law of causality.”159 She adds that Scotus knew the law of
causality in its Aristotelian version as “a chain of causation that would make movement
intelligible and ultimately lead to an unmoved source of all motions, the unmoved mover,
a cause that itself is not caused.”160
Scotus accepts Aristotle’s law of causality; nevertheless, he accepts it not
uncritically because if he accepted the law of causality as it is, freedom would be at stake.
Scotus, on the other hand, did not reject the law of causality, neither did he refute it.
However, he developed the theory of causality and modified it into a theory that can
accommodate or rather explain freedom.
Arendt claims that Scotus began his discussion by asking the question “whether
the act of the will is caused in the will by the object moving it or by the will moving
itself.”161 In fact, he rejects both answers. To explain, he rejects the first one, will is
moved by object because it is entirely contradicting to his principle on the Will’s
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autonomy and hence of freedom (or his unconditional commitment to freedom). Scotus,
as well, rejects the second answer that the Will is moving itself because it contradicts his
principle of the Will’s limitation. Arendt also adds that if the second answer is accepted,
there would be consequences to volition, which could not be explained. She did not
clarify what these consequences are.
The rejection of both answers led Scotus to adopt a median position and to
develop a theory called “theory of concurrent-partial causes,” which can save both
necessity and freedom, as Arendt argues. To explain his theory of concurrent causes,
another factor should be explained. It is Scotus’s critique of Aristotle’s account of
causality.
Scotus noticed that “the strength of the argument, or, rather, its explicatory force,
lies in the assumption that no more than one cause is sufficient to explain why something
should be rather than not-be, that is to explain motion and change.”162 Arendt argues that
Scotus challenges the chain-oriented theory of causality and proposes a theory of
causality that includes many concurrent causes for a thing to-be. The prime example for
Scotus is the simple daily fact of reproduction: “two independent substances, male and
female, must come together to bring forth a child.” As a result, “he reaches the theory
that all change occurs because a plurality of causes happens to coincide, and the
coincidence engenders the texture of reality in human affairs.”163
As a matter of fact, the theory of partial-concurrent causes proved that the very
phenomenon, change and motion, that led Aristotle to the law of causality, also led
162
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Scotus to the notion that change and motion are ruled by contingency.164 His theory led
him even to a different concept of contingency than that of Aristotle. Scotus prefers to
say that something is caused contingently rather than saying that something is contingent.
Arendt quotes Scotus:
by contingent, said Scotus, “I do not mean something that is not necessary or
which was not always in existence, but something whose opposite could have
occurred at the time that this actually did. That is why I do not say that something
is contingent, but that something is caused contingently.165 (Italics added)
Arendt explains Scotus in her own words by saying that “it is precisely the causative
element in human affairs that condemns them to contingency and unpredictability.” She
praises Scotus for his quite challenging position on the notion of contingency itself.
Scotus was the only thinker, according to Arendt, for “whom the word contingent has no
derogatory association.” For him, “contingency is a positive mode of Being, just as
necessary is another mode.”166 He was also quite shocking for his opponents, who were
in doubt about contingency. He confronts them with this example: “let all those who deny
contingency be tortured until they admit that it would be possible not to be tortured.”167
For Scotus’ quite unique position on contingency, Arendt states that “nothing indeed
could be in greater contradiction to every philosophical tradition than this insistence on
the contingent character of processes.”168
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III. C. The Modern Age
With the rise of modernity, there was more need for an organ for future, since modernity
obviously emphasized the future and the concept of progress. While medieval
speculations regarding the Will were still dominant in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
centuries, the discussions following Kant were dramatically different. 169 However,
Arendt skipped Kant because, for him, “the Will is not a special mental capability distinct
from thinking, but practical reason, a Vernunftwille not unlike Aristotle’s nous
praktikos.”170 She also continues to justify the absence of the Will as a mental faculty
from Kant’s philosophy: “Kant’s Will is neither freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium)
nor its own cause; for Kant, sheer spontaneity, which he often called “absolute
spontaneity,” exists only in thinking, Kant’s will is delegated by reason to be its
executive organ in all matters of conduct.”171
Arendt observes that with the last stage of the modern age: “Will begins to be
substituted for reason as man’s highest mental faculty.”172 At the turn of the Nineteenth
Century, “it became fashionable to equate Willing and Being.” For this reason, Arendt
proposes that for the philosophers of German Idealism, the Will was not a mental faculty,
but is transformed into an ontological entity.173 She states that for Schiller “no power of
man but his will,” for Schopenhauer “the Kantian thing in itself is the Will,” for
Schelling, “in the final and highest instance there is no other Being than Will.” This view
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on Will finally culminated in Hegel.174 Due to this transformation of the Will and its
eventual equation with Being, Arendt exempts the philosophers of the Will from her
historical exposition for she considers the Will a faculty of mind, not an ontological
entity. She clarified “ [I have] omitted from our considerations that body of thought,
German Idealism, in which sheer speculation in the realm of metaphysics perhaps
reached its climax together with its end.”175
Two modern philosophers were still relevant to her objectives: Nietzsche and
Heidegger. Nietzsche, who refuted the theory of the freedom of the Will for the last time,
was depicted by Arendt as a convert to ancient philosophy whose main inquiry was into
Being and his thought of eternal return was a conversion to the ancient cyclical concept
of time which means restricting the Will to willing that whatever happens shall happen
again and again.176 While Nietzsche repudiated the Will, Heidegger broke later with the
modern philosophy and its belief in progress, and he concluded that the Will should will
not-to-will.177
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IV

THE RELATION

Having explained Arendt’s exposition of political and philosophical freedom, I shall turn
now to the question of: What is the relation between political and philosophical freedom,
if any? As a matter of fact, Arendt sees no relation between the two types of freedom
other than the utter opposition of one to the other. I, however, infer three main aspects of
opposition between the two types: first, the origin or the human experiences that gave
rise to each one of them; second, the location of both of each; third, the conditions that
determine the existence or the experience of each one of them. The best description of the
relation between the two types is that they are completely distinct and differentiated from
each other.

IV. A. The Three Aspects of Differentiation
IV. A. 1. The Origin

The basic human experience that gave rise to each one of the two types of freedom is
completely different in nature. Political freedom originated in the human experience of
inserting ones’ self in the world by words and deeds. Philosophical freedom, on the
contrary, originated in the human experience of withdrawing ones’ self from the world
into the inwardness of one’s self, which no other selves has access to. Hence, political
freedom would have an appearance in the world, while philosophical freedom would not
have an appearance. Arendt considers anything that has no appearance in the world as
unpolitical by definition, such as experiencing one’s own will.
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According to Arendt, the original freedom is the political freedom. Men,
originally, lived together in a political community and experienced freedom in their
mutual interactions. She elaborates that “we first become aware of freedom or its
opposite in our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves.”178 She
affirms that the experience of inner freedom would not be possible if it were not preceded
by the experience of political freedom. She states that “man would know nothing of inner
freedom if he had not first experienced a condition of being free as a worldly tangible
reality.”179
The World, which exists because of the human existence, is a decisive factor in
the human experiences of freedom since the world functions as the scene of human
action. To be more specific, action does not take place in nature. If man existed in nature,
he would be reduced to animal laborans. That is, he will be occupied only with satisfying
his bodily needs and protecting his body from dangers of nature. On the other hand, the
World, which is conditioned by the human activity of work, is the scene of human action
since it gives the possibility for human beings to liberate themselves from mere bodily
needs and to fabricate a world of their own that would be a scene for action; “work…
corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence.”180
Political freedom in the Greek experience was conditioned by having a home (or
private space) in the world. Obviously, this is not guaranteed for everyone. Having one’s
private space in the world as a condition to be free in the public realm is automatically
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excluding the one who does not have his own space. This misfortune applies to many
groups in the polis, such as slaves, women and foreigners. Consequently, how could one
who is a slave in the world, for instance, experience freedom? This was the burden and
concern of Epictetus, who was a freed slave. Epictetus, as Arendt depicts, was looking for
a home in the world, but he did not find one. Thus, he turned inside his own self to find a
home that is not conditioned by any external conditions. As a consequence, the
experience of freedom in the outer world was transposed to the inner world. And hence,
the experience of inner freedom is a derivative in character. “The experiences of inner
freedom are derivative in that they always presuppose a retreat from the world, where
freedom was denied, into an inwardness to which no other has access.”181 Not only
Epictetus transposed the experience itself from outside to inside, he also transformed the
worldly relations that conditioned freedom into relations within one’s own self.182 In
other words, as the outer experience of freedom was conditioned by owning a home and
liberating ones’ self from necessities by ruling and dominating over others, who are not
free, the experience of inner freedom must be the same. Arendt clarifies this transposing
experience by stating that:
Epictetus transposed these worldly relations [having a place in the world and
having power over others] into relations within man’s own self, whereby he
discovered that no power is so absolute as that which man yields over himself,
and that the inward space where man struggles and subdues himself is more
entirely his own, namely, more securely shielded from outside interference, than
any worldly home could ever be.183
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The Experience of Epictetus could be interpreted as an early attempt to break up the
notion of freedom from the notion of politics for the sake of granting freedom to slaves
and reach a formulation “through which one may be a slave in the world and still be
free.”184

IV. A. 2. The Location

Understanding the experiences that gave rise to each one of the two freedoms, it is
possible to say that a main difference between both of them is the location of each one. In
other words, one could ask the question “what is the location of freedom?” Experiencing
freedom in the external world, where freedom would have an appearance and worldly
relations, is the political freedom; while experiencing freedom in the internal life, where
freedom hides from the world and lacks an appearance is philosophical freedom. Ilya
Winham agrees that “to attribute freedom to the (I-will) even if you could not do what
you will to do, is to separate freedom from movement in the world and thus from action
(I-can), and to locate it in intercourse with yourself.”185
Arendt, however, does not ask the question “where is the location of freedom?”
She rather asks the question “where is the proper location of freedom?”186 As a matter of
fact, Arendt does not see philosophical freedom as a genuine or a correct from of
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practicing freedom. Her reason is that the quality of freedom should be the I-can, where it
manifests in the outer world with other fellows; while philosophical freedom is a quality
of the I-will, where it is limited only to the inner realm. Arendt’s real concern in posing
the question in the form of “what is the proper location of freedom?” is to re-marry
politics and freedom again after they had been divorced for long centuries of
philosophical speculations centered on the theme of inner freedom or free will.
Arendt points out that it is only when the location of human freedom is transposed
from outside into inside, it is possible to incorporate the problem of freedom or the
question of freedom into the discipline of philosophy. Philosophy did not deal with the
subject of freedom in the political realm before theology accomplished the job of
transposing locations. This is for the reason that philosophy deals with human beings in
singularity only, not in plurality. When freedom was transposed into the inner domain of
man, it was ready to go under philosophical speculations. Thus, freedom became a
synonym to free will. As Arendt puts it:
Only when the early Christians, and especially Paul, discovered a kind of freedom
which had no relation to politics, could the concept of freedom enter the history of
philosophy when it was experienced as something occurring in the intercourse
between men. Free will and freedom became synonymous notions, and the
presence of freedom was experienced in complete solitude, “where no man might
hinder the hot contention wherein I had engaged with myself,” the deadly conflict
which took place in the “inner dwelling” of the soul and the dark “chamber of the
heart.187
And she also reiterates the same idea in the following passage:
…philosophers first began to show an interest in the problem of freedom when
freedom was no longer experienced in acting and in associating with others but in
187
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willing and in the intercourse with one’s self, when, briefly, freedom had become
free will. Since then, freedom has been a philosophical problem of the first
order…188
IV. A. 3. The Conditions
Having explained the differences between the origin and location of both philosophical
and political freedom, it is likely to recapitulate the conditions of each. Neither occurs
naturally or automatically, but there are conditions for each one to exist or to be
experienced.
Political freedom could not exist in a place other than where men live together in
a body-politic that is regulated by laws, norms and traditions. Not every body-politic
secures action-based interactions between its members. Only the body-politic founded
upon the principle of making action possible in a public realm (where agents can relate to
each other by words and deeds). This is in addition to the condition of equality between
its agents (i.e. not allowing the form of ruler-ship among the agents, neither to rule, nor to
be ruled). Moreover, the intersubjective space and the bodies of agents should be in a
secure and safe state for interactions, and must not be threatened by fear and insecurity.
Arendt recapitulates political freedom by stating:
Political freedom is distinct from philosophical freedom in being clearly a quality
of the I-can and not of the I-will. Since it is possessed by the citizen rather than by
man in general, it can manifest itself only in communities, where the many who
live together have their intercourse both in word and in deed regulated by a great
number of rapport-laws, customs, habits, and the like.189
On the other hand, philosophical freedom is conditioned by isolation and solitude. No
action in philosophical freedom, but only training is required to exercise ones’ will and
188
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master the self-inwardness. Moreover, philosophical freedom (or exercising free will)
does not need a public space to be experienced nor does it need other fellows and hence it
needs no recognition. Indeed, nothing could verify or testify free will because it has no
appearance; it is completely solipsistic. Arendt writes: “Nothing indeed can be more
frightening than the notion of solipsistic freedom- the “feeling” that me standing apart,
isolated from everyone else, is due to free will, that nothing and nobody can be held
responsible for it but me myself.”190
As a matter of fact, political and philosophical freedoms are limited. The political
type is limited because of the law or the constitution that includes normative principles
even if they are human-made; in other words, there is what “ought” to be done. Arendt
refers to Montesquieu on this matter. As the French thinker says:
It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but political
liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In…societies directed by laws,
liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not
being constrained to do what we ought not to will.191

Similarly, free will is, as well, limited. The Will could not deny Being altogether, as Duns
Scotus pointed out. Philosophical freedom is also limited by the body’s vulnerabilities.
And this is how suicide was justified in Stoicism (i.e. when outside circumstances were
no longer bearable). According to the Stoics, life after death is another form of being,
exactly as life on earth is a form of being.192
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The difference between the political and the philosophical freedom has not been
outlined clearly before Arendt outlined it in “What is Freedom?” and in the Life of the
Mind/Willing. In our understanding, we tend to think that free will (Philosophical
freedom) and freedom (political freedom) are synonyms. In fact, Arendt points out that
only Montesquieu noticed the difference: not because he was interested in the question
itself, but because he realized that free will, as articulated in his time, did not suffice for
political and the legal purposes. In the chapter entitled “Of the Liberty of the Subject,”
Montesquieu explains that “philosophical liberty consists in the free exercise of the will;
or at least, if we must speak agreeably of our will. Political liberty consists in security, or
at least in the opinion that we enjoy security.”193

IV. B. The Reversal and the Problem of Sovereignty
Another aspect that might shed light on the significance of understanding the two types of
freedom as separate phenomena is to ask the question: what if both types have been
exercised inter-changeably? What if we attempted to exercise the I-can in the internal
realm and the I-will in the external realm? Arendt suggests that it is irrelevant to exercise
the I-can in the inner self because the I-can always expresses itself in the outside and
always has an appearance. Political freedom consists mainly in action, and since I could
not act with myself, I could not experience the political freedom in solitude: “action… is
never possible in solitude or isolation.”194
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Similarly, philosophical freedom as an attempt to master the inwardness has no
appearance; therefore, it is politically irrelevant. Arendt argues that “this inner feeling
remains without outer manifestations and hence is by definition politically irrelevant.”195
However, the I-will might have the ambition to cross the boundaries of the self
and to extend itself in the public realm. In this case, if the philosophical freedom is
applied as such on the political realm, it will lead to endangering and cancelling political
freedom. To explain, the I-will constitutes itself in giving commands and demanding
obedience.196 The mastering of the internal realm means that one should be sovereign on
his own self, that is to say, having the supreme authority to command one’s self and
coerce it to obey.
Most conspicuously, if the I-will extends itself to the political realm, where others
also exist, it will exercise the same capacities: the capacity to command and to coerce for
demanding obedience; ultimately, to be sovereign over others. Exercising philosophical
freedom as such in the public realm implies hierarchy and presupposes inequality; hence,
to preclude the possibility of action, action should be between equals. Not to mention that
the mode of interaction in the command-obedience model is incompatible with the mode
of interaction in action-based models. The problem of sovereignty is a manifestation of
the exercise of free will in the public realm. Arendt asserts that: “…as such it was applied
to the political realm and thus has become a political problem as well. Because of the
philosophical shift from action to will-power…the ideal of freedom ceased to be
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virtuosity…and became sovereignty, the ideal of free will, independent from others and
eventually prevailing against them.”197
The faculty that identifies itself in commanding and obeying could not be a
faculty for freedom, but could only be a faculty for oppression, and therefore something
anti-political. Arendt explains that “the faculty of will and will-power in and by itself…is
and essentially nonpolitical and even ant-political.”198 The conflict that is inherent in the
formulation of I-will and I-nill or the I-will and I-cannot shall be transformed in the
public realm between numerous wills which, needless to say, would be in continuous
struggles and conflicts. In this case, the most powerful individual will, will end up taking
over the public realm and oppressing other wills. The other possibility that Arendt
explains is when an organized group succeed to reach a consensus in the “general will.”
Arendt argues that any political theory, which implies equating between free will
and freedom, leads to either one of two fatal consequences: either to cancel political
freedom entirely or to grant freedom of the will to one individual or one group at the
expense of canceling the freedom of others. Arendt elaborates as follows:
Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most
pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom
and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human freedom… or to the insight
that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only
at the prices of the freedom, i.e., the sovereignty, of all others.199
As philosophical freedom or the free will requires sovereignty, which is obviously
fatal to political freedom, Arendt adds an additional protective guarantee to political
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freedom. It is the condition of non-sovereignty. Freedom and sovereignty cannot be
identical and cannot exist simultaneously. Freedom consists in action while sovereignty
constitutes in command. While Arendt did not solve the problem of how the condition of
non-sovereignty could be realized, we can understand how a body-politic based on
sovereignty turns out to be inimical to freedom. Arendt explains that:
Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must
submit to the oppression of the will, be this, the individual will with which I force
myself, or the “general will” of an organized group. If men wish to be free, it is
precisely sovereignty they must renounce.200
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V

THE TRANSFORMATION

Having explained Arendt’s unique exposition and differentiation between political and
philosophical freedom, it still seems that the problem of freedom has not been settled. In
modern times we claim that we are for freedom; simultaneously, we assert that the notion
of sovereignty is indispensable for keeping the body-politic functioning. The
contradiction seems left unsettled.
Not surprisingly, Hannah Arendt did not aim at reconciliation between opposing
rivals, though she is unconditionally biased towards political freedom. Arendt went back
to the pre-Socratic Greeks to find refuge in a world where freedom was constituted in
action, not in willing.201 However, she admits that human experiences that led to the
discovery of the I-will and the human experiences of the philosophical freedom are
impossible to undo. Philosophical freedom is rooted and integrated in the body of the
philosophical, the religious and even the political traditions. Arendt explains how the
philosophical notion of freedom insinuated itself into the principles of the men of action.
She asserts that: “the philosophical ancestry of our current political notion of freedom is
still quite manifest in the eighteenth–century political writers, when, for instance, Thomas
Paine insisted that “to be free it is sufficient [for man] that he wills it,” a word which
Lafayette applied to the nation-state.”202
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How could freedom be protected from such an assault of the commanding and
oppressing faculty? Since it is apparently impossible to undo the experiences of the past,
I argue that Arendt’s insistence on the notion of beginning as a way of action and a way
to express one’s freedom is actually an attempt for the transformation of the faculty of the
Will into a faculty of Beginning. To argue for the thesis of transformation, I shall explain
how Arendt has been inspired by Augustine and Kant to articulate her notion of
beginning, which starts off from the mind but ends up in the external world.
Arendt calls the philosophy of Augustine “a philosophy of natality.” His
speculations on the creation of Man might have led him to define human beings as natals,
not as mortals like the Greeks. Augustine’s addresses of the question of “why it was
necessary to create Man, apart from and above all other living beings,” and he gave a
rather surprising reply. He argues that “in order that there may be novelty, a beginning
never before existed, that is, not before Man’s creation.”203 Moreover, he gives much
more significance to the creation of Man than to the creation of the world. He designates
two different words for the creation of each: he used the word initium for the creation of
Man and principium for the creation of heaven and earth. Augustine assumes that other
creatures were created in numbers, while Man “was created in the singular and continued
to be ‘propagated from individuals.’”204 The individuality of man, which accompanied
him from his very beginning, expresses itself in the Will. Thus, Arendt infers from
Augustine that “every man, being created in the singular, is a new beginning by virtue of

203
204

Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 108.
Ibid., 109.

71

his birth.”205 Hence, the beginning, which implies novelty, is the very manifestation of
the Will. As the creation of man has never been preceded by any similar creature and as
he himself is a beginning, he is able to initiate beginnings.
The beginning as a beginning that has not been preceded is one determining
element of Arendt’s concept of freedom. The other element is spontaneity, which Arendt
draws obviously from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where he proved that the faculty
of beginning a series is an act of freedom. Kant explains that:
…the faculty of beginning a series in time entirely on its own is thereby proved,
now we are permitted also to allow that in the course of the world different series
may begin on their own as far as their causality is concerned and to ascribe to the
substances in those series the faculty of acting from freedom.206 [Italics added]

Kant differentiates between the absolute and the relative beginning, which Arendt takes
to be very similar to Augustine’s differentiation between principium and initium.207 The
relative beginning is preceded by another state of affairs, but only in time not in causality.
Kant claims that:
One should not, however, be stopped here by a misunderstanding, namely, that
since a successive series in the world can have only a comparatively first
beginning, because a state of the world must always precede it, perhaps no
absolutely first beginning of the series is possible during the course of the world.
For here we are talking of an absolute beginning not as far as time is concerned
but as far as causality is concerned.208 [Italics added]
Nevertheless, Arendt points out that there is something remarkable regarding
what Kant calls “absolute spontaneity.” That is to say, spontaneity, as Kant argues in the
205

Ibid.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A450/B478.
207
Arendt, The Life of the Mind/ Willing, 110.
208
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A450/B478.
206

72

above passage exists only in thinking and not in willing. Therefore, Arendt infers that
Kant’s Will is not a separate mental faculty, but “a practical reason.” In other words,
“Kant’s Will is delegated by reason to be its executive organ in all matters of conduct.”209
Arendt criticizes Kant in the example of the chair, whereby he attempts to
illustrate what he means by absolute beginning regarding causality, which he considers
to be the human act of freedom. Kant states that:
If (for example) I am now entirely free, and get up from my chair without the
necessarily determining influence of natural causes, then in this occurrence, along
with its natural consequences to infinity, there begins an absolutely new series,
even though as far as time is concerned this occurrence is only the continuation of
a previous series. For this decision and deed do not lie within the succession of
merely natural effects and are not a mere continuation of them; rather, the
determining natural causes of that series entirely cease in regard to this
event…therefore it must be called, not as far as time is concerned but in regard to
causality, an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.210 [Italics
added]
Arendt’s main critique is that this example does not count for a free act because it lacks
an important element, which is the element of the role of mind in the act. Only when
there is “something in mind he wishes to do” does this series of events count for freedom
in Arendt’s account. She objects to Kant by saying:
…there is something fundamentally wrong with Kant’s example. Only if he,
arising from his chair, has something in mind he wishes to do, does this ‘event’
start a ‘new series’; if this is not the case, if he habitually gets up at this time or if
he gets up in order to fetch something he needs for his present occupation, this
event is itself ‘the continuation of a preceding series.’211
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Therefore, in Arendt’s view, this example would be significant in relation to her concept
of freedom as spontaneity, as long as it is reinterpreted as an attempt to reconcile “new
series of acts and states” with the time continuum that this ‘new series’ interrupts.” In her
critique, Arendt tries to make the interruption of the genuine unprecedented act to the
time continuum a comprehensible act of freedom.
VI

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, freedom for Arendt constitutes in bringing something new into

existence, (i.e. something which has not been existed before). Thus, freedom causes
events to happen, which appears in the guise of a miracle. And this miracle could not be
predicted beforehand by any given state of affairs. The choice between two given things
is not an act of freedom at all, for the two possibilities of choice already exist. Arendt
asserts that to create something new, we should begin or initiate, and we should act
together, not for or against others. Using the Kantian concept of spontaneity and the
Augustinian concept of beginning, the faculty of Will would be no longer a faculty of
command and coercion, but a faculty of future, of action, and of beginning.
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